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“Foryet it thou, and so wol I”: 
Absolving Memory in 
Confessio Amantis 
by Paul D. Stegner 
jOHN Gower structures Confessio Amantis on the sacrament of con-fession and, more particularly, on medieval penitential handbooks in order to treat the problem that “love is falle into discord.”1 Con-
fession is doubly inscribed in the Confessio—externally to repair “divi-
sioun” and internally to lead Amans toward self-awareness (pro. 992). 
just as Gower’s style of “the middel weie” between “lust” and “lore” 
(pro. 17–19) is grounded in his intent to repair the external division 
caused by religious, political, and social discord, the poem’s peniten-
tial structure is designed to remedy the lover’s internal division and 
to function as an “[e]nsample” for readers (pro. 196). Amans identifies 
his confessional exchanges with Genius as capable of restoring his de-
bilitated senses and providing a means to confess satisfactorily. Indeed, 
Amans expresses anxiety that his sinfulness has so afflicted his senses 
that he might fail to deliver a complete confession to Genius. He fears 
that he might “mistime / Mi schrifte” because he is “destourbed / In al 
myn herte” and “schal I moche thing foryete” but suggests that he can 
confess satisfactorily if Genius “my schrifte oppose / Fro point to point 
. . . / Ther schal nothing be left behinde” (1.220-27). Central to Genius’s 
confessional program, then, is the rehabilitation of Amans’s memory. 
The final events of the Confessio point to the effectiveness of Genius’s 
penitential method in restoringAmans’smemory. Amansmay continue 
to be a reluctant penitent after the end of “The Tale of Apollonius,” but 
once Cupid pulls out the arrow from his heart and Venus gives him a 
1 Pro. 121. All quotations from the Confessio Amantis are taken from The CompleteWorks 
of John Gower, ed. G. C. Macaulay, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899–1902) and will 
be cited in the text by book and line. 
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489 Paul D. Stegner
wondrous mirror that reveals his age, he experiences a conversion and 
asks for and receives absolution from Genius, who explains, “Thou hast 
ful pardoun and foryifte” (8.2897). He then withdraws “Homward a 
softe pas y wente” (8.2967). Critics have variously interpreted Amans’s 
memorial state at the conclusion of the Confessio as demonstrating a “re-
gained . . . sense of personal kingdom,” because “he now prays, as poet, 
for common profit, and right use of memory, and good governance” 
and a reintegrated Augustinian “spiritual memory.”2 In such interpre-
tations, the successful restoration of memory at the end of the poem 
reflects Gower’s literary project. yet for all of Genius’s care to revital-
ize the lover’s memory and to reconcile his interior spiritual condition, 
his absolution of Amans appears to undo this project: “Sone, as of thi 
schrifte / Thou hast ful pardoun and foryifte; / Foryet it thou, and so 
wol I” (8.2895–97).whereas Genius typically associates forgetting with 
sinful behavior, as in the case of Nebuchadnezzar’s Dream, it here be-
comes a positive, essential mechanism for Gower’s reintegration into 
the Christian economy.3 Genius’s command to forget demonstrates the 
limits of memory: spiritual transformation cannot occur without the 
appropriate remembering of sin, but the process can only be completed 
through the productive forgetting of the desire to sin. In this essay, I ar-
gue that Gower represents a recuperative form of forgetting in order to 
signal the difficulty of reconciling auricular confession with narratives 
of desire, and I reveal the deep pressure between the penitent’s mem-
ory of past transgressions and his reformation through confession. 
Forgetting amatory desire functions as a necessary conclusion to 
Amans’s memorial rehabilitation because of Gower’s treatment of the 
complex relationship between confession, amatory desire, and reason. 
From the prologue to the Confessio, Gower establishes an oppositional 
relationship between love and reason: “love . . . doth many a wonder / 
And many a wys man hath put under” (pro. 75–76).4 He figures this 
2 Russell A. Peck, Kingship and Common Profit in Gower’s “Confessio Amantis” (Carbon-
dale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 182; and Katherine R. Chandler, “Memory 
and Unity in Gower’s Confessio Amantis,” Philological Quarterly 71 (1992): 26. 
3 See Russell A. Peck, ed., Confessio Amantis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1980), xvii; and j. Allan Mitchell, Ethics and Exemplary Narrative in Chaucer and Gower 
(Cambridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2004), 69–70. On Genius’s attention to Amans’s sin of 
forgetfulness, see Patrick Gallacher, Love, the Word, and Mercury: A Reading of John Gower’s 
“Confessio Amantis” (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 49–70. 
4 On this oppositional relationship between kinde and reason, see Hughwhite, Nature, 
Sex, and Goodness in a Medieval Literary Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
174–219. See also Ellen Shaw Bakalian, Aspects of Love in John Gower’s “Confessio Amantis” 
(New	york: Routledge, 2004), 3–12. 
 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
490 Absolving Memory in Confessio Amantis 
conflict in terms of the tensions between the “lawe of kinde” (natural 
law), which he associates with Venus and venereal love, and the exer-
cise of right reason (1.31). Gower represents the limitations of kindely 
love separated from reason by associating it with blind, irrational lust 
and by defining it as fundamentally implicated in incestuous desire. 
Incest functions, as C. David Benson observes in his discussion of the 
brother-sister incest in the “Tale of Canace and Machaire,” “not [as] a 
wild aberration of sexual love, but its essential image.”5 Amans’s par-
ticipation in this incestuous venereal economy thus intensifies his inter-
nal discord between kinde and reason and, as a consequence, prevents 
his transformation from the lover Amans to the spiritually focused 
john Gower. The confessional process in turn seeks to mediate this re-
lationship between the amatory and the spiritual by effecting closure 
and regulating memory. In Gower’s poetic project, moreover, this pro-
cess functions not only as an individual model for unifying and healing 
Amans/Gower’s fractured self but also as a political model for reform-
ing the fragmented English kingdom. 
By representing a private, structured confession in the Confessio, 
Gower reflects in manyways larger developments in the administration 
and reception of the sacrament of penance.6 Gower’s treatment of con-
fession is situated within the larger penitential reforms initiated by the 
Fourth Lateran Council (1215). According to the Omnis utriusque sexus, 
the twenty-first canon of the council, 
Omnia utriusque sexus fidelis postquam ad annos discretionis pervenerit, 
omnia sua solus peccata saltem semel in anno fideliter confiteatur proprio 
sacerdoti; et injunctam sibi pœnitentiam pro viribus studeat adimplere, susci-
piens reverenter ad minus in Pascha Eucharistiæ sacramentum . . . alioquin et 
vivens ab ingressu ecclesiæ arceatur et moriens Christiana careat sepultura. 
[Every fidelis (faithful member) of either sex shall after the attainment of years 
of discretion separately confess his sins with all fidelity to his own priest at least 
once in the year: and shall endeavour to fulfill the penance imposed upon him 
to the best of his ability, reverently receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist at 
5 Benson, “Incest and Moral Poetry in Gower’s Confessio Amantis,” Chaucer Review 19 
(1984): 105. See also Henry Ansgar Kelly, Love and Marriage in the Age of Chaucer (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), 140–41; Peck, Kingship, 165–66; and A. C. Spearing, 
“Canace and Machaire,” Mediaevalia 16 (1993): 214. 
6 For a discussion of exempla in penitential manuals, see Morton w. Bloomfield, The 
Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference 
to Medieval Literature (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press 1952), 131–32. 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	  	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	  	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	  	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	
491 Paul D. Stegner
least at Easter . . . otherwise let him during his life be repelled from entering the 
church, and when dead let him lack Christian burial.]7 
The effect of the Lateran penitential reforms on the laity and the clergy 
is difficult to overestimate. Henry Charles Lea contends that the canon 
“is perhaps the most important legislative act in the history of the 
Church,” and Pierre Payer observes, “Of its many reforming decrees 
the twenty-first canon of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) likely had 
the most effect on the lives of ordinary people and on the parish clergy 
alike.”8 The medieval Church now expected the faithful to confess an-
nually and the clergy to administer the sacrament satisfactorily, a re-
quirement that led to the emergence of penitential manuals (Libri poeni-
tentiales) and writings for academics (Summae confessorum or Summa de 
casibus conscentiae).9 
Along with the Lateran Council’s requirement for annual confession, 
medieval writers articulated an etiquette of confession that was de-
signed to encourage contrition and a proper interior disposition and to 
avoid equivocation, concealment, and disobedience. Summaries of the 
components of a good confession began to appear in mnemonic verse.10 
Saint Thomas Aquinas’s so-called sixteen conditions in his commen-
tary on book 4 of Peter Lombard’s Sentences provides one of the most 
popular and influential examples of the form: 
Sit simplex, humilis, confessio, pura, fidelis,
 
Atque frequens, nuda, discreta, libens, verecunda,
 
Integra, secreta, lachrimabilis, accelerata
 
Fortis, et accusans, et sit parere parata.
 
[Let the confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful,
 
And frequent, unadorned, discreet, willing, ashamed,
 
whole, secret, tearful, prompt,
 
Strong, and reproachful, and showing readiness to obey.]11
 
7 Qtd. in Oscar D.watkins, A History of Penance, 2 vols. (London: Longman, 1920), 2:733 
and 2:748. 
8 Lea, A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church, 3 vols. (Phila-
delphia, 1896), 1:230; Payer, “Sex and Confession in the Thirteenth Century,” in Sex in the 
Middle Ages: A Book of Essays, ed. 	joyce Salisbury (New	york: Garland, 1991), 126. 
9 See Thomas Tentler, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1977), 28–53. 
10 See Bella Millett, “Ancrene Wisse and the Conditions of Confession,” English Studies 
80 (1999): 193–215. 
11 Qtd. in Tentler, Sin and Confession, 106–7. 
 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	  	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	  	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	  	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
492 Absolving Memory in Confessio Amantis 
The insistence on the conditions that the confession be simplex and ac-
celerata indicates the importance of regulating the presentation of sins 
as much as possible. In The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer’s Parson cautions 
against elaborate confessions—“Thow most tellen it platly [flatly, di-
rectly], be it never so foul ne so horrible”—and treating confession 
lightly: “Thow shalt nat eek renne to the preest sodeynly to tellen him 
lightly thy synne, as whoso telleth a jape or a tale, but avysely and with 
greet devocioun.”12 In the late medieval penitential tradition, the Domi-
nican Sylvester Prierias Mazzolini similarly indicates in his Summa sum-
marum the importance of making a simple confession.13 These condi-
tions emphasize the seriousness of the penitential process and inculcate 
the confessant’s obedience to his or her ghostly father.On a deeper level, 
the penitentials’ directions to confessors and confessants to handle sins 
without adornment suggest an awareness of the risks involved in the 
recollection of sins. 
Sexual sins in particular posed the most significant obstacle to the 
penitential process because they threatened to transform the lin-
ear, future-oriented momentum of confession into a recursive move-
ment in which former transgressions retain their appeal. According to 
medieval penitentials, confessors were required to question penitents 
about sexual sins but to treat them with caution. Accordingly, an early 
fourteenth-century manual supplies only general questions regarding 
sexual sins: “Haue 3e synned with enie senglewomman, wife, wydowe, 
with enie of youre kynne or enie of youre goostly children?”14 Priests 
were especially directed to avoid asking questions that could induce the 
penitent to commit further transgressions. when asking about marital 
sexual relations, for instance, priests were often warned about ques-
tioning the penitent about improper sexual positions unless the peni-
tent implied that he or she had transgressed in this area. “Manuals of 
penance,” writes Payer, “attempted to chart a middle course by advising 
confessors to be cautious in inquiring about the issue, but, if the evi-
12 The Parson’s Tale, 10.1021 and 10.1023. Quotations from The Canterbury Tales are taken 
from Larry D. Benson, gen. ed., The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Miff-
lin, 1987). Subsequent quotations will be noted parenthetically. R. Po-chia Hsia notes 
that Spanish missionaries in the Philippines were annoyed by Tagalog confessants who 
“discourse[d] . . . endlessly on various themes” rather than follow the prescriptions for a 
proper confession (TheWorld of Catholic Renewal, 1540–1770 [Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998], 180). 
13 Tentler, Sin and Confession, 107. 
14 Maria Luisa Maggioni, ed., Un Manuale per Confessori del Quattrocento Inglese (Ms. St. 
John’s College Cambridge S. 35) (Milan: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1993), 51. 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
493 Paul D. Stegner
dence suggested they should, to pursue the questioning to determine 
whether there was an infringement of the correct form.”15 The appro-
priate response to the memory of past sins is, to use Chaucer’s Par-
son’s phrasing, “sorweful remembraunce of the good that he hath left 
to doon heere in erthe, and eek the good that he hath lorn” (10.231). 
In confessional space, then, recollections of past transgressions must 
be restricted and channeled into their proper context—the economy of 
sin—before reconciliation to the Church and God is possible. Ideally, 
this reorientation accommodates the past in the present and moves the 
penitent forward in his or her spiritual life. 
In the Confessio, Genius conforms to the etiquette of confession by 
commanding that Amans offer a plain and complete account of his 
past sins.16 Genius insists, “let nothing be forsake, / Tell pleinliche as 
it is befalle” (1.210–11); and Amans requests that Genius “oppose” his 
confession “[f]ro point to point” (1.225–26) because he may be unable 
to remember all of his sins. By guiding Amans from point to point 
through the penitential rite, Genius offers a “systematic” examination of 
Amans’s conscience but one that will also avoid excessive adornment or 
amplification.17 The phrase “Fro point to point,” which can mean “item 
by item,” “in detail,” or “in every way,” takes on a special significance 
in the Confessio (MED, 5.d. and 6.d.). On the one hand, it articulates the 
connection between Genius’s method for administrating the rite of pri-
vate confession and the rehabilitation of Amans’s memory. On the other 
hand, Gower uses the phrase to define the purpose of his method at the 
beginning of book 1: 
To hem that ben lovers aboute 
For point to point I wol declare 
And wryten of my woful care, 
Mi wofull day, my wofull chance, 
15 Pierre Payer, The Bridling of Desire: Views of Sex in the Later Middle Ages (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), 77–78. See also Payer, “Sex and Confession,” 133; and 
Diane watt, “Sins of Omission: Transgressive Genders, Subversive Sexualities, and Con-
fessional Silences in john Gower’s Confessio Amantis,” Exemplaria 13 (2001): 549. john 
Burgh’s Pupilla oculi (1385) similarly warns confessors against “overly explicit” questions; 
see Henry Ansgar Kelly, “Penitential Theology and Law at the Turn of the Fifteenth Cen-
tury,” in A New History of Penance, ed. Abigail Firey (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 277. 
16 The illustrations of Amans’s confession to Genius in various manuscripts conform 
to the etiquette of confession prescribed by medieval penitential manuals. See jeremy 
Griffiths, “Confessio Amantis: The Poem and its Pictures,” in Gower’s “Confessio Amantis”: 
Responses and Reassessments, ed. A. 	j. Minnis (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1983), 163–78. 
17 j. A. Burrow, “The Portrayal of Amans in Confessio Amantis,” in Responses and Re-
assessments, ed. Minnis, 9. 
 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	  	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
494 Absolving Memory in Confessio Amantis 
That men mowe take remembrance 
Of that thei schall hierafter rede. 
(1.72–77) 
The completeness of Gower’s point-to-point narrative allows a man-
ageable form for the reader’s memory to process the material.18 This 
organization corresponds to the traditional conception of memory as 
a storehouse or treasurehouse in which an individual orders men-
tal images and then proceeds from place to place to retrieve them.19 
This structure not only provides the reader with a mnemonic strategy 
for arranging the narrative past of the poem but also seeks to alter 
the reader’s perspective on the material. As Steele Nowlin observes, 
“Gower’s reorganization of narratives of the past is received into the 
memory where it is assessed and reorganized and . . . becomes a new 
past,” a project that “can in fact restructure the present through the re-
configuration of the past.”20 Accordingly, Gower connects the activa-
tion of memory to a renewed awareness about the limitations of courtly 
love. The reader is to remember Gower’s woefulness, which he under-
scores by repeating “wofull” three times in two lines, from the newly 
fashioned perspective of an aged, impotent lover at the conclusion of 
the poem. By the same token, Genius’s “pointz of schrifte” (1.288) will 
enable a confession that will “shewen everychon” (1.246) so that Amans 
“schalt knowe and understonde / The pointz of schrifte how that thei 
stonde” (1.287–88). By defining where Amans stands in relationship to 
the Seven Deadly Sins, Genius claims that his exemplary method will 
18 In Mirour de l’Omme, Gower similarly connects the phrase to the proper exercise of 
memory. At the conclusion of the treatment of the Seven Deadly Sins, the narrator ex-
plains, 
Ore est a trere en remembrance 
Comme je par ordre en la romance 
Vous ai du point en point conté 
Des vices toute la faisance. 
[Nowone should recall how I have told you the story in order, from point to point, about all the doings 
of the vices.] (18373–76) 
English translation of the Mirour is taken from john Gower, Mirour de l’Omme (The Mir-
ror of Mankind), trans.william Burtonwilson, rev. Nancywilson Van Baak (East Lansing: 
Colleagues Press, 1992), 252. 
19 On the storehouse structure of memory, see Frances A. yates, The Art of Memory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 1–27; and Mary j. Carruthers, The Book of 
Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 33–45. 
20 Nowlin, “Narratives of Incest and Incestuous Narratives: Memory, Process, and the 
Confessio Amantis’s ‘Middel weie,’” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 35 (2005): 
238 (italics in the original). See also Mitchell, Ethics and Exemplary Narrative, 67. 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	  	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
495 Paul D. Stegner
rehabilitate Amans’s interiority and be able to lead him to a “conclusion 
final” (1.249). The announced style and structure of the Confessio, both 
in terms of Gower’s narrative frame and the confession itself, hold forth 
the promise of easily understandable and manageable content that will 
be conducive to the proper use of memory. just as Gower establishes the 
significance of his point-to-point narrative, he anticipates Genius’s re-
quirement that Amans confess “pleinliche” by advertising that his nar-
rative will be told “pleinly” (1.71). Despite the shift from the public to 
the private at the opening of book 1, then,Gower uses these stylistic and 
structural parallels to advance the shared goals of Amans’s private con-
fession and the broader political vision of the poem. 
At the beginning of book 8, however, Genius deviates from his previ-
ous narrativemethod by including a history of incest and only one exem-
plum, “The Tale of Apollonius,” to treat incestuous desire. Genius’s in-
clusion of incest would be an appropriate subject for confession because 
treatments of incest are often included in medieval penitentials.21 In 
Handlyng Sinne, for instance, Robert Mannyng calls incest the “werste” 
of the seven manners of lechery and states that “[y]e ner syb she ys hys 
kynde, / ye more plyght shal he þere fynde” (7369–74).22 But Genius’s 
concentration on incest to the exclusion of the other types of lechery 
raises questions about the progress of Genius’s confessional program. 
First, Genius proceeds to treat incest in spite of Amans’s protest that 
“[s]o wylde a man yit was I nevere, / That of mi ken or lief or levere / 
Me liste love in such a wise” (8.171–73). Second, and more significantly, 
the complex structure of the “Tale of Apollonius” directly challenges 
Amans’s memory, for, as Genius explains, it is “a tale in remembrance, / 
which is a long process to hiere” (8.268–69). Apollonius’s crisscrossing 
voyages across the Mediterranean and the doubling and even tripling 
of several of the characters—Apollonius/Antiochus/Athenagoras, An-
tiochus’s daughter/Thaise, and Antiochus’s wife/Apollonius’s wife— 
frustrate any attempt to establish a clear perspective for interpreta-
tion. The tale contains a “confusing narrative,” and its “compression . . . 
makes the story as difficult to remember in all its details as it is to forget 
21 See Elizabeth Archibald, “Incest in Medieval Literature and Society,” Forum for Mod-
ern Language Studies 25 (1989): 2; Georgiana Donavin, Incest Narratives and the Structure 
of Gower’s “Confessio Amantis” (Victoria: University of Victoria Press, 1993), 21; and jean-
Charles Payen, Le Motif du repentir dans la littérature française médiévale des origines a 1230 
(Geneva: Droz, 1967), 104–5. 
22 Mannyng of Brunne, Handlyng Sinne, ed. Idelle Sullens (Binghamton: Medieval and 
Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1983), lines 7373–74. 
 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	  	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	  	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	   	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	
496 Absolving Memory in Confessio Amantis 
in its entirety.”23 The tale requires Amans to interpret and to organize 
narrative material—the very abilities that he could not perform reliably 
at the beginning of the poem. 
Concluding Amans’s confession with a sustained treatment of incest 
nevertheless functions as a test case for Genius to measure the rehabili-
tation of Amans’s spiritual condition and memory. The history of incest 
and the “Tale of Apollonius” provide Genius with the occasion to re-
fute Amans’s protest that he has never been so wylde as to be affected 
by incestuous desire. Indeed, at the beginning of book 8, Genius com-
ments on Amans’s lack of proper understanding—“nou I see / Thi word 
stant evere upon o place” (8.184–85)—and his misguided willingness 
to “excuse / Of love such as som men use” (8.187–88). Genius’s central 
aim in book 8 is to bring Amans to the realization that his internal dis-
cord is a result of the connection between his amorous desire and in-
cest. Amans’s successful withdrawal from sinful desire depends on his 
ability to perceive kinde through the lens of reason. Following Aqui-
nas, Gower’s conception of the law of kinde corresponds to both natu-
ral appetite (appetitus naturalis) and sensual appetite (appetitus sensiti-
vus) and the law of reason to rational appetite (appetitus rationalis).24 The 
function of the appetites is involuntary, but acting upon them through 
the will (voluntas) is voluntary. As Aquinas states, “Potest enim homo 
velle et non velle, agere et non agere, potest etiam velle hoc aut illud, et 
agere hoc aut illud. Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis accipitur. Quid-
quid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc voluntas tendere 
potest.” (For man can will and not will, act and not act; again, he can 
will this or that, and do this or that. The reason (for) this is seated in the 
very power of the reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason 
can apprehend as good.)25 Original sin does not impair the freedom of 
the will, but it does disorder the appetites through the “disordered af-
fectivity” of concupiscenta, which leads the “natural desires and appe-
tites to pursue their own objects in disregard of the proper order of 
reason.”26 Concupiscence cannot control thewill, but it struggles against 
23 Larry Scanlon, “The Riddle of Incest: john Gower and the Problem of Medieval 
Sexuality,” in Re-Visioning Gower, ed. R. F.	yeager (Asheville: Pegasus Press, 1998), 115. 
24 Aquinas treats the appetites in Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 77–83 and the will in 1a2ae 
8–17. Quotations from Aquinas are taken from the Summa Theologiae, ed. and trans. 
Thomas Gilby, 60 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964–76), and transla-
tions are taken fromThe BasicWritings of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. and trans. Anton C. Pegis, 
2 vols. (New	york: Random House, 1945). 
25 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 13.6. 
26 Payer, Bridling of Desire, 48. 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	
497 Paul D. Stegner
the will toward desired objects. A similarly “antagonistic” relationship 
in the Confessio exists between kinde and reason because of “Nature’s 
lack of concern for morality” in the natural sex drive.27 The project for 
Genius in book 8 is to reveal that the “amoris causa” [cause of love] is 
the conflict between reason and kinde (book 8, margin 3).28 
Over the course of the Confessio, Genius gradually reveals that incest 
functions as a synecdoche for amatory desire. However, early in the 
poem, in the “Tale of Canace and Machaire” in book 3, Genius refrains 
from condemning brother-sister incest because of his divided allegiance 
toVenus.29 He describes their incestuous union as originating from their 
childhood living arrangements—“while thei be yonge, of comunwone / 
In chambre thei togedre wone”—and classifies brother-sister incest as 
a natural outgrowth of the law of kinde that Venus governs (3.149–50). 
By attributing their desire to Venus, who “is Maistresse / In kinde and 
techeth every lif / withoute lawe positif,” Genius identifies their inces-
tuous union with natural love (3.170–72). Likewise, in the catalogue of 
pagan gods in book 5, Genius expresses his reluctance to reveal the in-
cestuous roots of amatory desire. when Amans asks his confessor to 
“declare” (5.1380) the origin of Venus and Cupid, Genius expresses his 
unwillingness: 
Mi Sone, I have it left for schame, 
Be cause I am here oghne Prest; 
Bot for thei stonden nyh thi brest 
Upon the schrifte of thi matiere, 
Thou schalt of hem the sothe hiere. 
(5.1382–86) 
As with the endogamous relationships between ysis and Isirus (5.801–2) 
and juno and jupiter (5.1176–77), Genius states that Venus “[b]e jupiter 
hire oghne brother / Sche lay, and he begat Cupide” (5.1404–5); and he 
informs Amans of howCupid, in addition to being the product of an in-
cestuous union, committed incest with his mother: “[he] fond hisModer 
amorous, / And he was also lecherous. (5.1409–10). The incestuous ori-
27 white, Nature, Sex, and Goodness, 215. On the conflict between kinde and reason, see 
also james Simpson, Sciences of the Self in Medieval Poetry: Alan of Lille’s “Anticlaudianus” 
and John Gower’s “Confessio Amantis” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
167–97. 
28 Translations of marginalia in the Confessio are taken from Confessio Amantis, ed. 
Russell A. Peck and trans. AndrewGalloway, 3 vols. (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Pub-
lications, 2001–3). 
29 See Scanlon, “Riddle of Incest,” 106. 
 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	  	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
498 Absolving Memory in Confessio Amantis 
gin of Venus reveals how she represents “natural sexuality divorced 
from reason and, therefore, vulnerable to perversion.”30 Because Cupid 
lacked “yhen . . . / To se reson” and Venus “nothing wiste / Bot that 
which unto lust belongeth” (5.1412–15), their incestuous and promiscu-
ous acts underscore the “foule mescreance” (5.1444) of the Greek gods 
and irrationality of amatory desire.31 The incestuous origin of Venus op-
poses reason because it transforms an individual capable of interpret-
ing external reality, either through the physical senses or “bokes . . . / 
whereof the world ensampled is,” into one locked in blind desire (pro. 
46–47). Genius’s treatment of the incestuous origin of Venus indicates 
to Amans how his amatory desire has blinded him to reason. 
By the beginning of book 8, Genius openly condemns the incestuous 
undercurrents of amatory desire by following the common medieval 
comparison of incest to the sexual behavior of animals. In the history 
of incest, Genius explains to Amans that “love . . . is unbesein / Of alle 
reson” (8.153–54), and 
Bot as a cock among the Hennes, 
Or as a Stalon in the Fennes, 
which goth amonges al the Stod, 
Riht so can he nomore good, 
Bot takth what thing comth next to honde. 
(8.159–63) 
This image corresponds to Chaucer’s Parson’s description of incest as a 
sin that “synne maketh hem lyk to houndes, that taken no kep to kyn-
rede” (10.906). Genius compares incest to bestial desire in order to re-
veal, as Kurt Olsson writes, “what it is like for a person to live without 
choice, as a ‘beste’ limited to momentary sensual pleasure with those 
who live in closest proximity.”32 Genius’s treatment of incest recalls 
Gower’s description of wantonness in the Mirour: “Resoun est morte 
en telle gent / Vivant noun resonnablement, / Ensi comme fait la beste 
mue” (Reason is dead in such people, who are not living reasonably, but 
rather as dumb animals do) (9541–43). 
30 Denise E. Baker, “The Priesthood of Genius: A Study of the Medieval Tradition,” 
Speculum 51 (1976): 290. See also R. F.yeager, John Gower’s Poetic: The Search for a New Arion 
(woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1990), 180–87. 
31 The origin of amatory love in multiple incestuous relationships is a striking example 
of the immorality of irrational desire because it recalls Gower’s representation of the in-
cest between the Devil, Sin, and Death in the Mirour (205–76). 
32 Olsson, Gower and the Structures of Conversion: A Reading of the “Confessio Amantis” 
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1992), 216. See also 	white, Nature, Sex, and Goodness, 183. 
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In the “Tale of Apollonius,” Genius intensifies his treatment of the 
conflict between reason and kinde by detailing how incest reduces the 
“wys man” to the “wylde . . . man” (8.171). In that intensification, he 
uses the tale as a counterpoint to Amans’s own story because it con-
tains within its extended narrative the awareness that containing and 
escaping the incestuous underpinning of venereal desire require a 
“long process” (8.269). Genius uses the doubling of characters to estab-
lish the proper use of reason and memory in responding to the threat 
of incest. On the one hand, he represents Antiochus as a cautionary ex-
emplum of reason overwhelmed by incestuous desire. Antiochus em-
bodies all of the hallmarks of the bestial, blind nature of incest. The im-
mediate cause of Antiochus’s incestuous desire for his daughter is the 
death of his wife, which causes him to make “mochel mone” (8.283). In-
stead of turning outward to another exogamous relationship, however, 
Antiochus retreats inward to his daughter who “in hire fadres cham-
bres duelte” (8.291). Like the closeness of Canace and Machaire, that 
physical proximity contributes to development of incestuous attraction. 
Furthermore, Antiochus’s incestuous desire overpowers his conscience: 
For likinge and concupiscence 
withoute insihte of conscience 
The fader so with lustes blente, 
That he caste al his hole entente 
His oghne doghter forto spille. 
(8.293–97) 
This spiritual blindness causes Antiochus to become a “wylde father 
[who] thus devoureth / His oghne fleissh” (8.309–10) and to be so con-
sumed with “delit” that he “thoghte that it was no Sinne” (8.345–46). 
Antiochus’s incestuous rape of his daughter causes him to forget his 
appropriate roles as father and king. The creation of the riddle demon-
strates that his “hole entente” is focused on his “privete” rather than his 
public role as monarch of Antioch (8.425). 
whereas Antiochus functions as an exemplum of sinful forgetting, 
Apollonius acts as a model for freeing oneself from the unreasonable 
law of kinde through the use of right memory. The amatory temptations 
facing Apollonius, whom Genius describes as “ha[ving] to love a gret 
desir,” are in many ways analogous to Amans’s desire for his mistress 
(8.376). Moreover, both men are lovers confronted with the incestuous 
root of venereal desire: Amans encounters it through Genius’s explana-
tion of the origin of Venus and Cupid, whereas Apollonius discovers it 
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through Antiochus’s riddle of incest. Indeed, Genius links Apollonius’s 
narrative with Amans’s point-to-point shrift through the description 
of Apollonius’s solution of Antiochus’s unintelligible riddle, which he 
“rehersed on and on / The pointz” before offering the solution (8.421– 
22). Unlike Amans, however, Apollonius already exercises his memory 
and reason properly and is able to recognize the darker side of amatory 
desire. 
Apollonius’s success in avoiding the threat of incest depends on the 
technical skills that allow him to counteract the blinding effects of sor-
row. His technical skills keep in check his “hevynesse” (8.729–30). The 
significance of these skills is clear in Apollonius’s ability to adapt to the 
customs of Pentapolis. At thewrestling match, for instance, “Appolinus, 
which war and wys / Of every game couthe an ende, / He thoghte as-
saie, hou so it wende” (8.696–98), and his victories garner the attention 
of Arestrathes, who recognizes in his physical abilities his “grete gen-
tillesse” (8.730). Similarly, the prince’s musical skills delight the court 
and reveal “gentil blod” to Arestrathes’s daughter (8.794). Apollonius’s 
subsequent instruction of Arestrathes’s daughter in music and singing 
leads not simply to their marriage but also encourages her, unlike An-
tiochus’s daughter, to assert her ability to choose. As she states to Ares-
trathes, “Bot if I have Appolinus, / Of al this world, what so betyde, / 
I wol non other man abide” (8.898–90). Artistic skills thus function as a 
means to recuperate an individual after emotional trauma and serve as 
a medium through which to establish communication through reason, 
to “mesure . . . [what] ye mene” (8.773). 
At the same time, the transmission of knowledge underscores the con-
nection between the technical and the memorial. Not only does Apol-
lonius’s wife learn musical abilities from her soon-to-be husband, but 
she also arranges her knowledge accordingly in the storehouse of mem-
ory. This provides her with the necessary ability to recount her per-
sonal narrative to Master Cerymon in Ephesus: “Fro point to point and 
tolde him oute / Als ferforthli as sche it wiste” (8.1228–29). In creating 
a memory map, she secures a place in the temple of Diana in Ephesus 
in order “[t]o kepe and holde hir chastete” (8.1244). The deployment of 
technical skills has a twofold significance: it enables the individual to 
establish his or her social position and elicits the socially appropriate 
response from the listener. Likewise, Apollonius instructs Strangulio 
to raise his daughter Thaise in “bokes lore” during his absence (8.1300). 
This early education gives Thaise the ability to transform her private 
sorrows in Leonin’s brothel into public “wofull pleintes” (8.1442) that 
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“kepte hirself fro schame” (8.1446). By contrasting the different ways 
in which characters use language and artistic skills to respond to trau-
matic events, Genius offers an applied illustration of the correct rela-
tionship between reason and kinde. 
By the same token, the failure of the memorial and technical leads to 
the loss of reason and renewal of the threat of incest. Although Apollo-
nius initially escapes the threat of incest, news of Thaise’s death never-
theless causes him “pure sorwe and care” and leads him to withdraw 
into the privacy of the ship’s hold where he separates himself from 
external counsel (8.1599–600). The apparent loss of his daughter re-
inscribes him in the incestuous pattern of Antiochus by rendering 
him unresponsive to Thaise’s singing and “many soubtil question[s]” 
(8.1683) and leaving him “as a madd man” (8.1687). At this point, Apol-
lonius lacks the ability to recognize the very technical skills that initially 
allowed him to penetrate Antiochus’s incestuous riddle. The extent to 
which Apollonius has lost his reason becomes apparent when he strikes 
Thaise “with his hond,” for this act of violence functions as an analogue 
to Antiochus’s incestuous rape of his daughter (8.1693).33 Unlike Anti-
ochus’s daughter who always remains silent, however, Thaise applies 
her reason to perceive that he is “desesed” and responds “courtaisly,” 
Avoi, mi lord, I am a Maide; 
And if ye wiste what I am, 
And out of what lignage I cam, 
ye wolde noght be so salvage. 
(8.1696–99) 
Thaise’s rebuke causes Apollonius to recognize that “he hire loveth 
kindely / And yit he wiste nevere why” (8.1707–8). Apollonius’s in-
ability to perceive the cause for his attraction advances the limits of 
desire when separated from reason. He cannot understand fully his 
relationship with Thaise until their “hertes bothe anon descloseth”—a 
process that unfolds through a series of questions about her identity that 
he “unto this maide opposeth” (8.1711–12). By describing Thaise’s nar-
rative as moving “[f]ro point to point,” Genius underscores how reason 
effectively responds to the ambiguous impulses of kindely love (8.1725). 
Thaise’s narrative creates a space for her father to distinguish himself 
from the blind longings of Antiochus and to remember his appropriate 
place within the familial structure. In turn, it causes him to experience 
33 Elizabeth Archibald, Incest and the Medieval Imagination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2001), 98–99. 
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“such a joie as . . . / was nevere sen” (8.1733–34) and find “newe grace” 
(8.1739). Genius signals Apollonius’s reformation through his transi-
tion from the private to the public, from the endogamous attraction to 
Thaise to her exogamous marriage to Athenagoras.34 
Genius figures the completion of Apollonius’s rehabilitation in terms 
of penitence in an effort to emphasize to Amans the parallels between 
that and his internal discord. Apollonius’s rehabilitation allows him 
to make his “schrifte” with “gret devocioun / Of holi contemplacioun / 
withinne his herte” at the temple of Diana in Ephesus (8.1837–39). He 
manifests his spiritual recuperation and reintegration into the public 
sphere through recounting all of his adventures: 
And there in open Audience 
Of hem that stoden thanne aboute, 
He tolde hem and declareth oute 
His hap, such as him is befalle, 
And ther was nothing foryete of alle. 
(8.1842–46) 
On the narrative level, Apollonius’s ability to remember and recount 
his story without omission leads to the reunion with his wife. At the 
same time, in relation to Genius’s penitential program, it functions as a 
powerful didactic moment through which he signals to Amans the ne-
cessity of remembering the negative repercussions of incestuous desire. 
Likewise, Genius emphasizes the significance of memory in the moral-
ization at the end of the tale by encouraging Amans to recall the differ-
ence between Apollonius’s loving “[h]onesteliche” (8.1996) and Anti-
ochus’s loving “ayein kinde upon vengeance” (8.2007). The distinction 
between these two kinds of love points to Genius’s attempt to delineate 
between the positive form of lawful, amatory love in marriage and the 
negative form of disordered desire by which individuals “take lust as 
doth a beste” (8.2025). The repeated associations for kindely love with 
beasts and blindness throughout Genius’s treatment of the sin of lech-
ery are designed to demonstrate the sinfulness of love divorced from 
reason. 
After hearing the “Tale of Apollonius,” Amans explains that the “tale 
is herd and understonde” (8.2030) and signals his desire to bring his 
34 See Elizabeth Allen, “Chaucer Answers Gower: Constance and the Trouble with 
Reading,” ELH 63 (1997): 639. On exogamy as an imperfect solution to the problem of in-
cest, see Bruce Thomas Boehrer, Monarchy and Incest in Renaissance England: Literature, Cul-
ture, Kinship, and Kingship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 140–41. 
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shrift to a conclusion: “me be someweie teche / what is my beste, as for 
an ende” (8.2058-59).35 Genius responds by exhorting the penitent lover 
to remember the “ensamples” of the confession and “to withdrawe, / 
And set thin herte under that lawe, / The which of reson is governed / 
And noght of will” (8.2133–36). Genius has fulfilled Amans’s request 
to proceed from point to point through his confession and has brought 
him to the moment of choice: “I can do to thee nomore / Bot teche 
thee the rihte weie: / Now ches if thou wolt live or deie” (8.2146–48). 
Even though Amans indicates that he acknowledges the truth behind 
Genius’s advice—“Mi resoun understood him wel, / And knew it was 
soth everydel / That he hath said”—he nevertheless continues to con-
form his will to amatory desire: “bot noght forthi / Mi will hath nothing 
set therby” (8.2191–94). This refusal to regulate the will exacerbates his 
interior strife and further binds him to the law of kinde. Instead of ex-
periencing a moment of joyous recognition at the end of his confession 
like Apollonius, he continues to suffer as a dejected lover because he re-
fuses to accept Genius’s teaching.whereas Apollonius “accommodates 
natural law to reason and a generic moral probity (honestum), as well 
as to the special honesty of marriage and chastity,” Amans continues to 
place his faith in “lust [which] is but awhile” and languish as a dejected 
lover (8.2139).36 Amans’s resistance to Genius even goes so far as to lead 
him to transform his previous confession into an exculpatory complaint 
by arguing that love should not be bound by reason: “For wel I wot, 
and so do ye, / That love hath evere yit ben used, / So mot I nedes ben 
excused” (8.2168–80). Amans’s appeal to the history of amatory desire 
serves as a counter-narrative to Genius’s history of incest and warning 
against those whose “lust of love excedeth lawe” and indicates his at-
tempt to use memory to justify his disordered love (8.263). Amans’s re-
sistance to Genius and his insistence on composing the supplication to 
Venus suggests that the confession has been unable to effect a spiritual 
rehabilitation. 
The interaction between Amans and Venus nevertheless indicates 
the degree to which the confession contributes to the lover’s internal 
transformation, for whenVenus asks him for his name, he replies, “john 
Gower” (8.2321). The emergence of john Gower from the allegorical 
35 The Latin marginalia at 8.2030 similarly indicates the end of Amans’s confession 
and his reliance upon Genius: “Confessio Amantis, vnde pro finale conclusione consilium 
Confessoris impetrat” (The Lover seeks the Confessor’s counsel as a final conclusion). 
36 Kurt Olsson, “Natural Law and john Gower’s Confessio Amantis,” Medievalia et 
Humanistica, n.s., 11 (1982): 232. 
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role of Amans signals a fundamental identity shift. No longer defined 
entirely by his amatory pursuits, john Gower here occupies an inter-
mediary place between lover and penitent. This shift remains incom-
plete because a disjunction exists between the still amorous Gower’s 
false memory of himself as a lover and his present reality as an old 
man. Venus attempts to force Gower to accept the need to forsake his 
role as a lover because “[i]t is no riht that thou it have” (8.2376). She in-
sists that he recognize his inability to participate further in the venereal 
economy: “Forthi my conseil is that thou / Remembre wel hou thou art 
old” (8.2438–39). A difference exists between Venus’s and Genius’s con-
demnation of Amans’s love, and that difference stems from their atti-
tudes toward the law of kinde. Baker observes that “although Genius 
condemns Amans’s love because it unreasonable and, therefore, sinful, 
Venus objects only because he is old and impotent.”37 while both re-
quire Amans to reject the self-delusion of an aged lover, each demands 
a different site of refocusing: Venus insists upon his submission to the 
material reality of kinde, whereas Genius counsels him to reconcile kinde 
and reason and direct his love towards the divine. Despite these differ-
ences, both call on Amans to exercise right memory and thereby assume 
his appropriate place in relation to the amatory and spiritual economies. 
In an apparent paradox, though,Genius andVenus’s project to restore 
Gower’s memory is accompanied by his forgetting of his past amatory 
impulses. The removal of the “fyri Lancegay” (8.2798) provides Resoun 
with the opportunity to remove “the sotie / Of thilke unwise fanata-
sie” (8.2865–66) and make him “sobre and hol ynowh” (8.2869). The 
emphasis on forgetting in the final events of the Confessio reveals how 
the destabilizing potential of the memory of amatory desire continually 
threatens to reactivate its original transgressive impulse. The only rea-
sonable response for overcoming venereal desire is to reconceptualize it 
as a fantasy and forget that it ever was. Thememorial effacement of past 
experiences effectively gives birth to the penitent Gower. 
This identity shift anticipates the kind of forgetfulness that accompa-
nies the transcendence from earthly to heavenly existence. In De civitate 
Dei, Saint Augustine distinguishes in his discussion of the operation of 
free will in heaven between the knowledge of past sins and the feelings 
that result from them: “Quantum ergo adtinet ad scientiam rationalem, 
37 Baker, “Priesthood of Genius,” 291. See also Mariá Bullón-Fernández, Fathers and 
Daughters in Gower’s “Confessio Amantis”: Authority, Family, State, and Writing (Cambridge: 
D. S. Brewer, 2000), 7. 
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memor praeteritorum etiam malorum suorum; quantum autem ad ex-
perientis sensum, prorsus immemor” (As far as its rational knowledge 
is concerned, it also remembers its past evils, but as for actually feeling 
them, they are completely forgotten).38 This type of forgetfulness does 
not entail the repression or elimination of past memories but is rather 
limited to the guilt and suffering associated with them. The saints in 
the City of God “carebunt enim omnibus, ita ut penitus deleantur de 
sensibus eorum” (will be so unvexed by evils that evils will be com-
pletely out of their memory).39 In this manner, Augustine preserves 
the blessed’s knowledge of the memory of their own pasts even as he 
frees them from the negative effects of sin. For Augustine, the joys of 
heaven would not be possible without this positive form of forgetting. 
Along the same lines, in the monastic tradition, the final goal of the 
“storehouse of memory,” writes janet Coleman, is to achieve “the kind 
of knowledge that is atemporal, eternally present, a knowledge that re-
quires for its achievement the forgetting of . . . all the constituents of the 
past which comprised the material, experienced world of a man’s pri-
vate past and personality.”40 Gower’s spiritual resignation signals that 
the recovery of memory through confession likewise gives way to the 
positive forgetting of his former amatory pursuits. 
At the same time, forgetting at the conclusion of the Confessio radiates 
outward to involve the social as well as the personal. Venus’s question-
ing of Gower about “[w]hat love was” provides Gower with the occa-
sion to display his newly restored right reason and to perform success-
fully his forgetfulness:
       And I for schame 
Ne wiste what I scholde ansuere; 
And natheless I gan to swere 
That be my trouthe I knew him noght; 
So ferr it was out of mi thought, 
Riht as it hadde nevere be. 
(8.2872–77) 
38 Saint Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. George E. 
McCracken et al., 7 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957–72), 22.30. For a 
brief discussion of the different treatments of forgetting in heaven, see Miroslav Volf, The 
End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 
131–51. See also Harald weinrich, Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting, trans. Steven 
Rendall (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 24–39. 
39 Augustine, City of God, 22.30. 
40 Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 155. 
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Gower’s profession of forgetting the past verifies his disposition toward 
amatory desire. In his absolution, Genius furthers this performance of 
forgetting when he commands Gower, “Foryet it though, and so wol I” 
(8.2897).41 Genius’s promise of mutual forgetfulness conforms to the 
orthodox conception of the relationship between penitent and confes-
sor after the completion of the penitential rite. Medieval theologians 
and preachers made a “persistent attempt” to “persuad[e] people that a 
supernatural power immediately effaced from the memory of the priest 
all the sins confided to him.”42 At the same time, Genius appeals to a 
reciprocal, social form of forgetting and thereby transforms the rite of 
private confession, to use Isabel Karremann’s terminology, into a public 
rite of oblivion.43 Gower advances the success of his forgetfulness after 
the disappearance of Venus, for “Unto the lif y hadde usid / I thoughte 
nevere torne ayein” (8.2964–65). The complete lack of desire to return 
to his former life evinces how self-forgetting converts Gower’s perspec-
tive from past amatory desire to the future-oriented prayers of “joie . . . 
endeles” and charitable love (8.3172). 
In the concluding prayer of the Confessio, Gower reinforces the so-
cial relationship between memory and forgetting by evoking a future 
for England when “men takyn remembrance / what is to live in unite” 
(8.2988–89). He nevertheless frames the poem with acknowledgments 
of the impossibility of remedying the divisions of the land. just as he be-
gins book 1 with an explanation that “I may noght strecche up to the he-
vene /Min hand, ne setten al in evene / This world, which evere is in bal-
ance” (1.1-3), he concludes book 8with an admission of failure in curing 
the effects of love in the world: “Of love and of his dedly hele, / which 
no phisicien can hele. / For his nature is so divers” (8.3155–57). yet ap-
pealing to the memory of a unified England registers Gower’s effort 
to transcend the otherwise insurmountable problems in the present. 
For Gower, as for Augustine, “[m]emory becomes anticipation, and 
the longing of the will for beatitude reaches out in hope for the future 
fulfillment.”44 Gower gestures toward this Augustinian conception of 
41 On strategies of self-forgetting, see Garrett A. Sullvian, jr., Memory and Forgetting in 
English Renaissance Drama: Shakespeare, Marlowe,Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005), 1–24. 
42 Lea, History of Auricular Confession, 1:422. 
43 Karremann, “Rites of Oblivion in Shakespearian History Plays,” Shakespeare Survey 
63 (2010): 24–36. 
44 Michael j. Scanlon, “Arendt’s Augustine,” in Augustine and Postmodernism: Confes-
sions and Circumfession, ed. john D. Caputo and Michael j. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005), 161. 
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the individual mind’s ascent through sensory perception to memory 
itself and finally beyond it to a form of mystical contemplation of God.45 
But Gower’s concentration on the social also extends his understanding 
of memory to include productively forgetting the limitations of human 
agency. In holding on to and letting go of his memories, Gower indi-
cates how remembering an English society bound together in unity first 
depends on forgetting the divisions that fracture the kingdom.46 This 
focus on forgetting present conflicts and remembering a unified past 
takes on a particular significance in the tumultuous political climate 
in which the Confessio was composed and revised. In this sense, Gower 
uses memory and forgetting as one possible strategy for reconciling En-
gland’s Ricardian past with its Lancastrian present and future.47
 California Polytechnic University 
45 See Saint Augustine, Confessions, ed. w. H. D. Rouse, trans. w. watts, vol. 2 (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1912), 10.17.26. 
46 On social forgetting, see Paul Ricoeur,Memory, History, and Forgetting, trans. Kathleen 
Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 500–501. 
47 I would like to thank Robert R. Edwards, william Fitzhenry, and Steele Nowlin for 
their thoughtful suggestions on various revisions of this essay. 
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